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ABSTRACT
Ports form part of the logistical infrastructure of the global economy. This 
article argues that both recent security and mobilities literatures are placing 
too much emphasis on supposedly all-encompassing global technologies to 
govern them. It uses a controversies approach to develop a greater sensitivity 
to the diversity in the global makings of mobility and security. By looking at 
the port of Dar es Salaam, it reveals how controversies result from variegated 
understandings of situated political economies and offer a unique window 
to reveal more diverse and contested landscapes than is suggested by the 
literature. Three controversies are analysed: (1) cargo security; (2) delays 
in dwell time; and (3) modernity ‘from scrap’ or ‘from scratch’ (Dar versus 
Bagamoyo).
Introduction
Logistical infrastructure, together with finance and extraction, is at the core of contemporary capitalism 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). Hence, the political geographies of these infrastructures, particularly those 
of ports, have received increasing attention (Chalfin 2010; Cowen 2014). A global assemblage of supply 
chain security has led to an internationalised, privatised and digitalised management of ‘pipelines’ and 
‘zones of exception’ to maintain global trade flows (Cowen 2014, 90). Security practices that complement 
the rationale of protecting a bounded ‘homeland’ have increased following attempts to channel flows 
by means other than those of the technology of state territory (e.g. Cowen 2014). One such element 
is to design ports both as ‘seamless gateways’ through which ‘the global economy’ is enacted, and as 
outposts of homeland security. This, naturally, potentially undermines or circumvents de jure notions 
of sovereignty being attached to state territory under the current international system, as it extends 
border management ‘outward into the ports of foreign states [… and] inward along domestic trans-
port networks’ (Cowen 2014, 81). Not all of this is spectacular or exceptional, of course, but very much 
mundane and normalised. Research on mobilities and the emergence of a ‘global surface of logistical 
integration’ (Martin 2013) pointedly illustrates this last point perhaps even more strongly than the 
security literature does.
However, in both literatures there has been a tendency to (over)emphasise supposedly common 
transnational policies and practices to manage mobility and security around ports (Cowen 2014; Martin 
2013; Neilson 2012). These common practices are established on the basis of empirical work on US and 
European ports and, to some extent, other members of the champions league of global ports, such 
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as Singapore or Dubai. Cowen, for instance, concentrates on US ports and US policy initiatives. The 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code was a response to terrorist threats instigated by 
the 9/11 attacks that is administered by the UN International Maritime Organisation, but was devised with 
major US involvement (2014, 176ff). Although differences between ports have been stressed in several 
literatures, the critical security and mobilities literature on African ports illustrates the issue particularly 
well. Chalfin (2010) and Stenmanns and Ouma (2015) have traced how transnational security standards 
and mobile technologies play out on the continent, and both studies examine the case of the Ghanaian 
port of Tema. Stenmanns and Ouma present Tema as yet another instance of ‘ISPS almost everywhere’ 
(2015, 96), highlighting it as the archetypical example of global logistics and the securitisation of ports 
in regard to both theft and terrorist threats. However, against this ‘story of ordering logistics politically 
everywhere’, we argue that local variations require more empirical attention and a different conceptual 
approach. By comparing the West African port of Tema in Ghana – the most heavily studied African port 
in regard to security, mobility and logistics – with the East African port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, the 
casual observer may discover parallel trajectories – but also glaring disparities between them. In terms of 
mobility, the port of Dar has only just been managing. Instead of seamless flow, container traffic is slow, 
the port congested, and technical fixes are introduced after great delays, if at all. In terms of security, the 
port is a latecomer compared to Tema, and several attempts to introduce new surveillance and control 
technologies have failed (see Section ‘Governing mobility and security in African ports’).
Building on the case of the port of Dar es Salaam, this article shows how recurrent controversies 
amongst port stakeholders challenge the hegemonic aspirations of transnational governance technol-
ogies, as well as the local port authority. It achieves this through a controversies approach, which we 
introduce. By controversies, we refer to disputes that emerge around technical matters, especially those 
that question technical fixes and standard narratives about infrastructure. These include, therefore, ‘every 
bit of science and technology which is not yet stabilised, closed or “black boxed”’ (Macospol 2007, 6; 
Venturini 2009). Borrowing from Science and Technology Studies, some work in critical security studies 
has begun to explore the strength of such a perspective (Schouten 2014; Walters and D’Aoust 2015).
Studying such controversies, we argue, contributes to a better understanding of how the supposedly 
smooth workings of logistical ‘seam space’ (Cowen 2014; Martin 2013) are negotiated, contested and 
obstructed in different ways. It brings to light competing attempts to make sense of (dis)order, and 
highlights the fragile and uncertain undercurrent of technical fixes in ports, thereby opening up the 
‘black box’ of ordering logistics politically. By focusing on African ports, we specifically aim to contribute 
to a greater sensitivity in capturing the situated and multifaceted ‘global makings’ (Hönke and Müller 
2016) of the mobility and security infrastructures both in and from the Global South.
This complements other work on mobilities that highlights the disruptions and frictions in supply 
chains (Gregson, Crang, and Antonopoulos 2017). While we embrace the call to move ‘beyond accounts 
that recite global logistical power to further interrogate logistics-in-action’ (ibid., 394), by using con-
troversies we offer an alternative take on this work. The controversies that arise as a result of varie-
gated understandings of situated political economies offer a unique frame of reference to reveal more 
diverse and contested landscapes than the pervasive ‘story of ordering logistics politically everywhere’ 
would suggest. Importantly, this approach also maps out multiple agencies and competing political 
economies. Our work contributes to both mobilities and security literatures, and we emphasise that, 
apart from smoothing mobility flows or securing logistical space, (port) controversies bring to light 
underlying issues at stake that are contested by means of discourses and practices that merely pose 
as being about ‘mobility’ or ‘security’.
The fieldwork supporting this article was carried out in Dar es Salaam in the spring of 2015. The study 
employs interviews with a variety of port stakeholders and authorities – including the port management 
– involved in clearing and transporting cargo from and to the port of Dar es Salaam. It also draws on 
figures and narratives produced by the port authority and international donors in policy papers and 
expert reports. The latter are complemented with sources from Tanzanian newspapers.
The first section introduces recent developments around security and mobility in African ports and 
illustrates the limitations of the ‘logistics everywhere’ arguments by examining the cases of Tema (Ghana) 
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and Dar (Tanzania) port. The second and third sections discuss infrastructure in critical security and 
mobilities studies, revealing how a controversies approach offers a valuable entry point that is better 
able to capture the distinct and variegated way in which techniques to produce order in logistical 
infrastructure are negotiated and transformed. The remaining parts illustrate this aspect by featuring 
three controversies in and around Dar es Salaam port: (1) how to secur(itis)e cargo; (2) how to fix delays 
in dwell time; (3) and efficiency from ‘scrap’ or from ‘scratch’ – the Bagamoyo versus Dar controversy. The 
article concludes with the implications for future research on ports and other logistical infrastructure.
Governing mobility and security in African ports
Africa has seen a boom in external investment in economic infrastructure, including in ports. The 24th 
summit of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, discussed infrastructure as one of three major themes, 
integrating the growth of ports, rail and roads into the narrative of developmental statism (AU 2015). 
In Tanzania alone, several major projects are under way, e.g. the World Bank, the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID), and the TradeMark East Africa-funded project to upgrade the 
port of Dar es Salaam (US $565–596 million, sources differ as to the actual figure) (The East African, 26 
January 2017). The most spectacular project is the planned new 800-hectare, US $10 billion megaport 
at Bagamoyo, about 60 km North of Dar es Salaam (BBC, 7 June 2016).
Despite the overall investment in port infrastructure and the growth of transnational integration, 
there is widespread and substantial variation in how mobility and security are governed, and how 
supposedly global standards are implemented. According to Chalfin (2010), transformations of port 
governance in Tema since the late 1990s have taken place along two lines: (1) the Ghana Ports and 
Harbours Authority (GPHA) has built up its authority vis-à-vis other stakeholders by partnering with 
transnational private logistical operators, in part through the roll-out of managerialist technical fixes (i.e. 
software platforms – see Tettey (1997) – and regional benchmarking) that allow the GPHA and logistical 
operators to adjudicate flows of cargo and people more conveniently; (2) the GPHA and logistical opera-
tors have progressed in securitising cargo and people by subscribing to international standards, notably 
the ISPS. Tema’s ‘port security apparatus’ reproduces the story of ‘ISPS almost everywhere’ (Stenmanns 
and Ouma 2015, 96). In a slightly less enthusiastic study about Tema, which emphasises technopolitical 
inventions whilst also calling our attention to seemingly mundane technologies, Stenmanns and Ouma 
underscore how the GPHA and donors employ Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) and other ‘space 
metrology jargon’ to encapsulate the developmental achievements of Tema vis-à-vis other regional 
ports (Stenmanns and Ouma 2015, 89).
Although it is less imposing than its Ghanaian counterpart, the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) has 
nevertheless also sought to jump on the bandwagon of ‘the story of ordering logistics politically every-
where’. Yet, arguably, the port of Dar has only just been managing lately. Marred by recurrent scams 
and subsequent reshuffles in its top echelons, the TPA and the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) have 
both been at the centre of recurrent public scandals. ‘Lost’ containers and unpaid port and tax duties 
have remained a habitual feature; dwell times, or the number of days that cargo remains within the 
port, have worsened, with container vessels queueing for more than 10 days on average; and the port 
and its adjacent roads have become synonymous with congestion (Dooms and Farrell 2017; World 
Bank 2016). The TPA has benefitted from much less autonomy than the GPHA, as is evidenced by 
the Tanzanian presidency regularly bypassing the TPA in leading projects (Dooms and Farrell 2017). 
Thereby, the trajectories of producing order logistically in Tema and Dar, despite running parallel, have 
progressed asynchronously. Dar has invariably experienced a 5–10-year lag in reproducing each and 
every breakthrough in Tema.
Arguably, the port of Dar es Salaam embodies the ‘almost’ version of Tema’s ISPS narrative. Tema 
remains at the forefront of security technologies as well as in practices in global logistics in Africa. The 
port of Tema incorporated the ISPS code barely three months after its adoption by the United Nations 
in 2003. Furthermore, it first commissioned a cargo scanner in 2004; closed-circuit television (CCTV) was 
installed in 2005; and electronic gates in 2015, which would reportedly enable biometric verification 
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one year later (GPHA 2014). Both port authorities introduced ISPS; Tema did so in 2004, but Dar did not 
manage it until early 2010, once the security deficiencies identified by US authorities had been solved 
(US Embassy Tanzania 2009). Additionally, Dar es Salaam only started to deploy CCTV in 2016 (AllAfrica, 
26 February 2016; Ghana News Agency, 29 June 2005; TPA 2016).
Specific diagnoses of problems, and how to address them, vary widely in different contexts. Tema 
deployed its first online tax clearance platform in 1991. Dar es Salaam only caught up many years later 
(Awotwi 2011; World Bank 2007). The World Bank complained early on that ‘the Port of Tema in particular 
… [has] become heavily congested’ (World Bank 2010). As a result of the boom in containerised traffic 
since the early 2000s, Tema purportedly hit the one million TEUs record in 2014 (GPHA 2014). Yet in 
2011 Tema also ranked at the top of the ‘hall of shame’ of six major, yet poorly performing, African ports 
– its average dwell time reached 20 days, that is, five times that of Durban and twice that of Mombasa 
(Raballand et al. 2012). Moreover, at US $425 per day, congestion charges were ten times that of the 
continental benchmark of Dakar (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Faced with increasing pressures 
to address congestion, the port of Tema was an early adopter of the landlord model, inviting trans-
national private logistical operators to undertake the management of part of its quays and terminals 
(Chalfin 2010). Dar es Salaam also adopted, amidst international praise, the landlord model (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Dwell time in Dar es Salaam port stabilised at around ten days in the early 
2010s (World Bank 2013) – a notable 50% less than in Tema. Yet, if one narrative still predominates in 
discourses about the Dar es Salaam port in recent years, it is that of congestion. According to the World 
Bank, ‘as a result of privatization in the 1990s, the port became one of the most efficient in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but its performance deteriorated gradually up to the mid-2000s’ (World Bank 2013, X). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, reports by multilateral institutions came to problematise the port’s logistics as involving 
‘slow processing, particularly the processing of customs clearances, and excessively long storage periods’ 
(AfDB 2010; CCTTFA and TradeMark East Africa 2016; World Bank 2013, 35).
This paints a very different picture from that of Tema. The contrast between Dar and Tema shows that 
there is more diversity in the deployment of transnational logistical and security standards in African 
ports than is often acknowledged. Controversies over infrastructure hubs reveal important variations. 
At Dar port, the controversies that arise as a result of contested perceptions of the issues at stake, and 
how to govern them, help illustrate how the governance of mobility and security is continuously being 
contested and constructed.
Global infrastructure hubs: critical security studies meets mobilities
Science and Technology Studies have long argued that infrastructure and society are closely related 
and that contemporary power is exercised by and through complex technical systems and standards. 
This extends political analysis to include infrastructure hubs and technical systems, which have recently 
started to receive more attention in International Relations (Aradau 2010; Cowen 2014; Hönke and 
Cuesta-Fernandez 2017; Mayer and Acuto 2015; Salter 2015). In critical security studies, this discussion 
tended to revolve around infrastructure and technology as objects or actants of securitisation. It has 
been shown that infrastructure has become a new issue in domestic and international security (Collier 
and Lakoff 2008) and how it has come to be perceived as being in need of protection, for which a 
range of pre-emptive transnational security measures have emerged. In this vein, global supply chain 
security, for instance, has come to roll out technology for scanning containers for nuclear material, in 
addition to broader ISPS standards. In this way, domestic border management is extended outward 
into foreign ports.
In the mobilities literature, attention has been focused on new sociotechnical systems and the 
emergence of logistical surfaces that make goods flow (Martin 2013, 2014). Much has been written on 
such flows and how ‘multimodal port complexes become the crucial nodes’ in new mobility systems 
which ‘aspire … to establish a continuous and “global surface of logistical integration” (Martin 2013)’ 
(Birtchnell, Savitzky, and Urry 2015, 4). Nevertheless, making things move relies on multiple spatial fixes, 
including paradoxically those that accommodate immobility (Cresswell 2010) and stillness (Bissell and 
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Fuller 2011; Cresswell 2011). Growing mobility depends on similarly growing ‘multiple fixities or moor-
ings often on a substantial physical scale that enable the fluidities of liquid modernity’ (Sheller and Urry 
2006). Through offshoring (Urry 2014), national taxation and regulation is circumvented in corridors 
and zones of exception (Sheller 2016, 21, 22). The better-documented process of financialisation has 
its counterpart in the massive investment in infrastructure of circulation, such as ports, railroads, and 
other digital and network trade technology (Birtchnell, Savitzky, and Urry 2015). Capital is mobile, but 
also builds on offices, national affiliations, off-shore zones and ports; territoriality is not vanishing, but 
it remains crucial for enabling globality for some citizens, whilst excluding others (Jessop, Brenner, and 
Jones 2008; Opitz and Tellmann 2012). Others have stressed that logistics has created an abstract space, 
one in which ports are integrated through processes of containerisation, unitisation and standardisation 
(Martin 2014), where ports and the technologies of making things flow are contested, and any (idea of ) 
seam space is merely a product that needs to be reified and worked out in different contexts (Gregson, 
Crang, and Antonopoulos 2017).
However, both literatures have tended to (over)emphasise the commonality of practices of governing 
and securing ports, and thus, at least implicitly, have assumed the diffusion of transnational standards 
and practices; whether through the containerisation (Martin 2013, 1028) or securitisation (Cowen 2014) 
of shipping mobilities. Indeed, Cowen rightly demonstrates the emergence of supply chain security as 
a global assemblage with rationalities, professionals, and technologies that extend across borders. To 
secure ‘seamless systems’ (Cowen 2014, 76–90), she shows that supply chain security has come to work 
through moving border space inwards and outwards (of the state), as well as through the creation of 
exceptional zones in which domestic laws and rights are mediated or suspended. According to her, 
port environments have become such zones (ibid., 81).
Nevertheless, while mobility and security practices around logistics today result from commercial 
concerns to ‘eliminate many forms of friction and insecurity that beset globalised or “stretched-out” 
production processes’ (Birtchnell, Savitzky, and Urry 2015, 3), it is not clear how far these particular, 
securitised perceptions of infrastructure and homogenised technological zones of ‘seam space’ hold 
beyond the US and Europe. The actual empirical effects of transnational policies and standards in prac-
tice, and how they play out in diverse social and political settings, remain insufficiently understood. 
Processes of diffusion and transfer of policies, technologies and procedures are not homogeneous or 
unidirectional (Amicelle et al. 2015; Hönke and Müller 2016), nor always successful.
This article, therefore, suggests the lens of infrastructure controversies to explore the multifaceted 
and contested transformations of power and authority in ports. As Pat O’Malley (2001) argued, one must 
beware of looking for mere examples of already known rationalities and technologies of governing, as 
this risks producing overly neat, often overly sympathetic, portraits of ‘neoliberal’ governmentality void 
of physical violence. In empirical terms, Brenda Chalfin’s (2010) work on maritime security in Africa and 
the port of Tema leads the way in this respect. She highlights how port development and state author-
ity co-evolve and lead to unexpected results in how ports are governed, including how transnational 
technological fixes and devices – such as cargo scanners and other electronic equipment – operate as 
actants and transform how power is exercised. Transnational standards and professional practices in the 
technological zones of global transport are, thus, neither ‘internally homogeneous [n]or static’ (Barry 
2012, 327) and operate in different ways. Certainly, ports are typical instances of new ‘calculable spaces’ 
(Rose and Miller 1992), made possible by the quiet revolutions in logistics, among other factors. In these 
growing transnational technological zones, governance by standards, comparison and by rendering 
distinct objects as similar proliferates (Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez 2017). At the same time, however, 
as Barry (2012) reminds us, new objects become matters over which to disagree. As ports become ever 
more entwined with transnational standards and technologies, new objects emerge around which 
controversies arise (see also Marres 2005).
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A controversies approach
A controversies approach, we suggest, involves directing our attention towards moments of contes-
tation and controversy around the technologies and regulations that supposedly govern (through) 
logistical infrastructure. Technical devices and standards not only have a powerful influence on shap-
ing how mobility and security are governed – this is now well established in security and mobilities 
research (e.g. Aradau 2010; Easterling 2015) – but they are also disputed, and spark (more or less public) 
controversies. In line with Marres, we argue that it is important to analyse the occasions when issues 
are debated and alternative accounts proliferate (Marres 2007, 775; also Venturini 2009; in security 
Schouten 2014). Focusing on these disputes contributes to the understanding of logistics and (port) 
infrastructure in both literatures by: (1) foregrounding questions of politics over those of governance 
and powerful logistical assemblages (Walters and D’Aoust 2015, 55); and (2) emphasising processes as 
fundamentally open-ended.
In Science and Technology Studies, two types of interest in controversies have prevailed (Barry 2012, 
326). The first emerged as ethnographic methodology to study scientific laboratories and open the ‘black 
box’ of scientific knowledge. The innovative suggestion of these early studies was to understand the 
settling of scientific debates as ‘closure’ – the temporary stabilisation of a particular version of things 
that was most powerful at that point – and not a representation of ‘the truth’. This offers insightful guid-
ance for controversies outside of the world of science: instead of searching for the most truthful claim, 
it redirects analysis towards closure; that is, successfully blocking out contradiction, contingency and 
alternative accounts of what the problem was and/or how it should be addressed. The second tradition 
thus revolved around public knowledge controversies, such as around the safety of nuclear power 
plants or the risks and effects of new technologies. This second generation has also been criticised, 
in particular for not paying enough attention to the historicity of the particular political situation in 
which knowledge controversies unfold as part of ongoing negotiations of power and authority (Barry 
2012, 330). Furthermore, many controversies concern matters other than claims to (technical/scientific) 
knowledge, which remained overlooked (Wynne 2003). Controversies are a useful tool for analysing 
disputes beyond scientific knowledge controversies in a narrow sense (Schouten 2014; Venturini 2009).
Building on the above, we use a controversies approach to capture disputes around seemingly tech-
nical matters of port logistics and security: issues around ‘technology which is not yet stabilised, closed 
or “black boxed”’, and is basically used ‘as a general term to describe shared uncertainty’ (Macospol 2007, 
6; op cit. in Venturini 2009). With this third perspective, we draw on Barry (2012) by interpreting contro-
versies as bringing ‘political situations’ to the fore. Political situations are neither fixed nor focused on 
political settlements defined by relations between key groups of actors, but are a result of ongoing, con-
tingent processes of order-making in which transnational technologies and imaginaries play a key role.
In these processes of order-making, first, the very definitions of what needs fixing, and how, are 
contested. As such, they provide an entry point to ‘ontological politics’ (Mol 1999; Schouten 2014), 
offering a way to observe the making of situated and distinct infrastructure politics that are otherwise 
only encountered once they have been ‘black-boxed’ and taken for granted. Thinking from controversies 
extends beyond what comes into view through a ‘logistics’ or ‘security’ frame. What is understood as 
‘security’ must not be treated as a given, and the starting point of analysis, but as under-construction 
and re/defined in practice; this being most visible in moments of contestation (see also Coleman and 
Rosenow 2016, 4; Schouten 2014).
In complex and multi-layered settings such as ports, controversies must, secondly, be studied as part 
of a political situation to illuminate the existence of multiple controversies that overlap and intertwine 
(Barry 2012, 332; Foucault 1991). It follows, then, that everyday practice, key ideas, standards and tech-
nical devices play a crucial role in negotiating authority and transforming how power is exercised in 
ordering infrastructure hubs. They reveal the situated, fragile, and ‘hybrid regimes of practice’ (Hönke 
2013) of governing ports, through attention to what is being problematised in a particular situation, 
the competing diagnoses of such problems, and the different actions considered in response, within 
and well beyond neoliberal modes of managing logistical space. Additionally, such an approach brings 
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into view the agency of those governed by travelling technologies and transnational standards as also 
playing a role in shaping local outcomes. Controversies conceived in this way may also be a tool to 
unveil shifts in authority and power around economic hubs.
A caveat is in order before we move on to examine Dar es Salaam port. Whilst looking for uncertainty 
and moments of disagreement, a controversies approach also requires being attentive to (attempts 
at) ‘black-boxing’ knowledge and closing a controversy. When something is stabilised, alternative 
accounts become almost invisible/inaudible: a controversy is closed. It finds expression in the successful 
black-boxing of (potential) fragility, complexity and heterogeneity. Latour refers to this as a process that 
‘makes the joined production of actors and artifacts entirely opaque’ (1999, 183). Thus, for instance, in 
the case of a major dam building project in Ethiopia, Abbink (2012) shows how the techno-economic 
project conducted by central state authorities is presented as a depoliticised, ‘necessary’ venture, but 
one which advances the government’s hegemonic governance model and defines citizens in the process 
as displaceable, expendable subjects that can be relocated and re-educated. Transnational regulations 
and logistical technology might be used to close local port debates via claims of authoritative expertise 
or procedures. However, as Barry (2013) shows, they do not always serve to reduce controversies. First, 
whether or not something is framed as (a)political is at the core of what many controversies are about. 
And second, they often instead generate new objects over which to debate and disagree.
Drawing on controversies around Tanzanian ports, the following sections illustrate how such an 
approach allows us to understand diverse, geographically and historically situated infrastructural orders.
Controversy I: how to secur(itis)e cargo
The first controversy in the port of Dar pits the port and tax authorities against clearing agents and 
transporters. It emanates from recurrent episodes in which containers have been cleared without due 
payment of fees, or cargo stolen from within the port premises or from nearby Inland Container Depots 
(ICD). The controversy has peaked in the last years, since the disappearance of containers from within 
the port premises became recurrent. Reportedly, in 2016, it was discovered that 3000 containers were 
‘missing’ from port warehouses. Containers had been cleared from the port or, more commonly, from 
Inland Container Depots outside the port’s boundaries, without due payment of taxes and port charges. 
In late 2015, this issue made it to the headlines of national newspapers immediately after the election of 
new Tanzanian President John Magufuli. Together with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Transport, 
Magufuli launched a concerted, disciplinary campaign against corruption and pilfering at the port. 
On 7 December, Magufuli sacked the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Works, the TPA Director 
General, three additional senior and eight middle management workers, and dissolved the TPA board 
on allegations of 3000 containers having been cleared from the port without due payment of TZS 80 
billion (US $40 million) (Daily News, 7 December 2015). Containers go amiss in many ports (Langewiesche 
2004), yet it was the sheer scale of the phenomenon in Dar that was startling. An audit carried out in 
late December 2016 revealed that 11,884 containers and 2019 vehicles had reportedly been cleared 
from the port to ICDs without payment of wharfage fees (Reuters, 8 December 2015; The Citizen, 30 
December 2015). In parallel, with the surge in the number of Inland Container Depots in the vicinities 
of the port, concerns about the security of containers outside the port gates – in transit between the 
port, ICDs and importer’s warehouses – have soared. One freight forwarder recalls how a truck driver 
manipulated the system whilst hauling a container full of tyres from one ICD to his warehouse, only 1.2 
kilometres away, and fled with the cargo (Anonymous Freight Forwarder 2015). In outright contrast to 
the hi-tech processes of cargo tracking through GPS systems, freight forwarders and consignees instead 
highlight the low salaries drivers receive, compounded by the night operations brought about by the 
development of the 24/7 scheme, as the chief cause of insecurity.
The security controversy revolves around what facilitates these thefts and how containers are smug-
gled out, and how to quell the phenomenon. Concerning the definition of what needs fixing, port 
authorities signalled the inadequacy of the technical means available in the port. Prior to 2014/2015, 
security checks and access controls at the port were performed manually. According to the then Acting 
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Port Manager, the decision to grant access to the port premises was taken by the security guards on 
the spot, who did so in an inconsistent manner, something which the new Integrated Security System, 
backed up by electronic swipe cards, would redress once and for all (Mhanga 2015). By contrast, other 
port stakeholders drew attention to extensive mismanagement and, crucially, the collusion between 
insiders and outsiders. Freight forwarders, consignees and transporters did not question the opportunity 
to enhance the technical means available to enforce security in the port. However, they also highlighted 
the need to address illicit behaviour by port officials in parallel, if not beforehand. Accordingly, to one 
freight forwarder operating in the port, the associated corruption and a general failure to oversee mat-
ters explained the perennial phenomenon of the ‘missing’ containers (Anonymous Freight Forwarder 
2015). Thereby, where the Port Manager blamed human failure and placed trust in electronic vetting, 
other port stakeholders highlighted the political economy of the functioning of the port.
In an attempt to settle the controversy, the TPA resorted to an exercise in public relations featuring 
ISPS-inspired measures at its core. By resorting to ISPS – ostensibly a global security standard driven 
by fears of terrorist attacks – the port authority re-signified the code as being in favour of indige-
nous security aims. This exercise was embodied by the launch of the Tanzania Ports Handbook. In its 
first two editions, in 2015/2016 and 2016/2017, the technologies to produce ordering were the major 
theme. Extolling the possibilities of technical fixes and compliance with international standards, the 
TPA appealed to ISPS. Hence, the Tanzania Ports Handbook 2016/2017 emphasised how access to the 
port had been greatly tightened in 2015; how magnetic swipe cards, renewable each year, had been 
introduced in 2015/2016; and that powerful tower lights had been refurbished or installed, 465 CCTV 
cameras set up, and X-ray scanners installed. Revealingly, clearing agents did not oppose the deploy-
ment of ISPS-inspired technologies, rather the opposite. Only a minority of truck drivers and petty 
smugglers voiced their opposition or acted surreptitiously against the deployment of such technologies, 
particularly cargo-tracking measures (Anonymous Freight Forwarder 2015). Donors also contributed 
to the exercise and, according to the EU, these new technologies should enable a massive reduction in 
the excessive amount of physical inspections carried out, currently affecting 50% of containers pass-
ing through the port. More broadly, scanning ought to facilitate a shift from control through physical 
inspections to ‘light touch’ probes focused upon cargo cleared by unreliable forwarders and importers/
exporters with a tarnished track record, thus leaving reputable operators largely unhindered.
However, the introduction of new technical fixes in early 2016 only triggered new disputes, as Barry 
would have predicted. Faced with fresh allegations of ‘missing’ containers, the government and the TPA 
accused clearing agents of operating outside the rulebook. Government officials and port authorities 
somehow tried to convince the public that unscrupulous freight forwarders could be singled out by 
their arrears in professional fees. Clearing agents retaliated by accusing TPA and TRA officials of being 
corrupt. In addition, the TPA also tightened its procedures for the release of cargo making a stopover 
at ICDs, which would henceforth require mandatory TRA approval. In such moves, the TPA had earlier 
been accompanied by the private operator running the container terminal, the Tanzania International 
Container Terminal Services (TICTS), which was proud to make the international systems and audits 
in place known to the visitor upon entrance.1 TICTS, for instance, had embarked earlier upon public 
communication of the introduction of new recording and monitoring software, now handling 80% 
of container throughput. With new software allowing the movement of any single container to be 
assigned to a specific operator, TICTS could well boast of a superior capacity to pre-empt undesired 
moves outside the established procedure.
All in all, the controversy over the security of cargo reveals two aspects. First, divergence from sup-
posedly ‘global’ security concerns is evident in terms of which aspects matter (e.g. loss of containers 
more than terrorist threats). This is the case in spite of the fact that participants in the controversy are 
in agreement about the rightness of the ISPS-inspired measures. With the minor exception of truck 
drivers and petty smugglers, the interests of many appear to align neatly with the TPA’s stated claim 
to use ISPS to improve security. Nevertheless, while the securitisation of cargo appears successful on 
the discursive level, the issue remains controversial in practice. In order for consignees and freight 
forwarders to realise the benefits of technical security fixes, the political economy of the port needs to 
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be dealt with first, or at least in parallel. This opposition, however, plays out in a sphere that only occa-
sionally reaches the public domain. It is within this domain that port authorities attempt to settle the 
public controversy by mobilising the virtues of ISPS and its attendant technological fixes. This section 
illustrates our broader argument that the interplay between the ‘power of logistics’ (Neilson 2012) and 
technical fixes incorporated by ports, and local political economies is crucial to be able to understand 
the specific, and contested, ordering of ports.
Controversy II: what causes delays, and how to reduce them
The second controversy opposes the same actors as the first, but this time over ‘congestion’ (or how 
to cut delays in clearing cargo from the port). To counter the losses induced by stalling cargo, the 
port authorities have responded on multiple fronts. The first front witnessed the substitution of the 
Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), the customs management software (CMS) introduced 
in the 1990s – later updated to ASYCUDA++ in 2005 – which was superseded by the Tanzania Customs 
Integrated System (TANCIS) (Keasi 2005). Introduced in March 2014, TANCIS promised to revolutionise 
the clearing of cargo in the port of Dar. TANCIS was introduced with notorious delays, however, as its 
roll-out was allegedly marred by the reluctance of key actors within the TPA to cooperate (Anonymous 
Freight Forwarder 2015). According to the TRA, TANCIS is ‘built on hi-tech principles with a view to 
increasing effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and reliability in the Customs administration’,2 and 
rides the wave of earlier similar systems that have been introduced in Hong Kong (1986), Singapore 
(1989–1991), Malaysia (1996–2004), Ghana (2001) and Nigeria (2009). TANCIS is the latest of many moves 
by the TRA and TPA to facilitate tax compliance by importers, and, crucially, to speed up the clearing 
of cargo from the port. Other related recent developments by port authorities include the currently 
embryonic electronic Single Window System (eSWS),3 the One Stop Centre, and the Single Customs 
Territory (SCT) – the latter of which states six categories of products that pay taxes in the first port of 
entry into the East African Community, regardless of their final country of destination.
What is even more interesting, TANCIS has become central to efforts by the TRA and TPA to eliminate 
delays, and for good reason. These electronic devices promise a handy managerialist fix to issues that 
outside actors – notably freight forwarders, transporters and shippers – understand as driven by less 
aseptic – and more pernicious – political incentives. Again, the controversy on the causes of delays, and 
the solutions needed to reduce them, pits managerialist fixes against a more political framing of the 
issue. The latter encapsulates two claims: too much state, and corruption. Whilst the TPA and TRA believe 
that the progressive roll-out of TANCIS, the electronic single window and the One Stop Shop Centre 
will in time smooth the flows of cargo entering and leaving the port, other port stakeholders believe 
the political economy of the taxation and certification agencies renders the authorities’ expectations 
unjustified. Under new regulations, the TRA retains the core jurisdiction over taxation and, crucially, over 
authorising the displacement of containers or bulk cargo inside and/or outside the port boundaries. 
Yet an array of other public agencies is also legally mandated to perform a variety of controls.
Thus, the Weights and Measures Agency must compare the quantities in the consignment with those 
stated in the Pre-Arrival Declaration. The Ministry of Agriculture, the Government Chemist Laboratory Agency, 
and the Sugar Board, have the prerogative to inspect pallets, the nature of chemicals, and the quantities and 
quality of sugar, respectively. And whilst the Tanzanian Food and Drug Authority almost exclusively performs 
documentary controls of food, pre-packaged goods, and medicines, the Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission 
may dispatch samples to its laboratory in Arusha in order to ascertain the absence of radiation. Likewise, the 
Tanzanian Bureau of Standards may visit the importer’s warehouse to assess conformity with regulations.
All these agencies have a stake in processing documents, yet most may, at the will of their officers, 
instigate a physical verification as well. Accordingly, many stakeholders fail to understand why the 
same checks are carried out by different agencies: ‘Most are doing the same tests …: the same colour, 
porosity, density … The whole thing is designed in such a way that they keep on doing [sic] their reve-
nue, their income, etc.’ (Anonymous Consignee 2015). Indeed, some associate these checks with road-
blocks manned by unscrupulous police officers, who ask for bribes to let vehicles pass, or to overlook 
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documentation so clearance may be granted at the port. Accordingly, for some freight forwarders, 
shippers and transporters, fixes to delays may come from more efficient procedures and software, but 
also from more forceful initiatives to thwart corruption. A controversy about how to diminish immobility 
also helps to reveal the practices of state actors to routinely regulate immobility (Cidell 2012).
Even though TANCIS had not been fully deployed when fieldwork was carried out (in mid-2015), it 
has nonetheless triggered at least two substantial alterations in the everyday working of cargo clear-
ance producers. First, it has replaced physical, more informal, encounters between tax officials and 
clearing agents in favour of virtual procedures. One consequence of this is that TANCIS has resulted 
in the laying off of a legion of cashmen and messengers who previously roamed around the city and 
the port. Second, TANCIS has also created a dual space for encounters between tax agents and freight 
forwarders, as some procedures were still being carried out on paper. Thus, tax agents and freight for-
warders swing back and forth between the physical and the virtual environment and, consequently, 
abide by different rules of engagement. This offers a precious tactical advantage for tax agents in their 
(legal and not so legal) encounters with other port stakeholders. The parallel with the introduction 
of the Customs Management System (CMS) in Tema, in 2003 cannot be overstated, where customs 
personnel lost substantial facilitation payments to look elsewhere when cargo left the port without a 
declaration (De Wulf 2004).
Again, the controversy over delays and inefficiencies, where they derive from, and their solutions not 
only attests to two coexisting frames – i.e. managerialist versus political fixes – but also to two concom-
itant projects to close the controversy; one on the premise of technical and transnational standards, the 
other on fixing the political economy of the port first. This evokes how ‘the consolidation of transna-
tional technological zones both constitutes new objects of measurement … and translates them into 
matters about which it is possible to disagree’ (Barry 2012, 328). However, an insight that is specific to 
this controversy emerges forcefully. The controversy over delays reveals how the shifting of conflicts to 
virtual environments is contested by horizontal wrangles across and within governmental agencies, as 
well as by vertical skirmishes between top and rank-and-file port authorities. It thus provides a glimpse 
of complex interactions between the global logistical agenda and the local political economies, and 
diverse, situated outcomes of transnational technologies of governance.
Controversy III: efficiency from scrap or from scratch? Bagamoyo versus Dar
In the final controversy, which is perhaps the most publicly discussed, the positions of each category of 
participants are less clear-cut. For a section of the Tanzanian economic and political elites, the ultimate 
fix to the delays in the port of Dar is the construction of a new US $10-billion mega port in Bagamoyo, 
some 60 kilometres north of Dar. Inspired by the ‘Dubai model’, Bagamoyo, an altogether new port (thus 
our label ‘efficiency from scratch’) to be funded by China and Oman, is portrayed as the solution to the 
irredeemable spatial inefficiency of Dar. Those in the opposite camp suggest demolishing some existing 
buildings instead as the first step towards a re-organisation of flows within Dar port (thus ‘efficiency 
from scrap’). The future of the port of Dar is put to debate by competing views on reformability, and, 
in fact, competing visions of modernity and efficiency.
The Bagamoyo project is hardly new. The idea of a new port in Bagamoyo has been present in the port 
community since at least 2007. However, the project did not actually start to take shape until October 
2014, when Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding with China and Oman. Thereafter, reports 
in the media about the progress of the project were contradictory, until a major breakthrough occurred 
in October 2015 when, two months before his mandate expired, President Kikwete laid the foundation 
stone for the 800-hectare port, and an adjacent 1700-hectare Export Processing Zone in his hometown. 
However, it took only one month for the new Magufuli administration that took office in late 2016 to 
announce that the Bagamoyo project would be temporarily shelved for at least six months until fur-
ther studies were conducted. To many, this move signalled that President Magufuli might have chosen 
instead to refurbish the existing port of Dar es Salaam in line with the funding already approved by 
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the World Bank. However, in 2016, the Omani State General Reserve Fund opened an office in Dar es 
Salaam, and the construction of the port was put back onto the agenda. The government variously 
blamed one sponsor or another for the delays but has announced in October 2017 that the new port 
will be operational from 2020/2021.4
The ongoing controversy over Dar versus Bagamoyo confronts arguments of economic and spatial 
efficiency. For those in the efficiency camp, Dar port is underutilised and there still remains plenty 
of room for efficiency gains that might accommodate the projected growth in throughput over the 
coming years. They dismiss the need for a new megaport in Bagamoyo based on arguments that 
highlight the lack of economic and logistical rationale. In the words of a consignee, ‘expert’ inter-
national designs will be able to produce the much-desired boost in efficiency at Dar port, as much 
as 50% (Anonymous Consignee 2015). This position is echoed by a freight forwarder, in a telling 
analogy: ‘If I have a car that I don’t service … buying a new car is not gonna [sic] solve my problem’ 
(Anonymous Freight Forwarder 2015). Furthermore, those of a political mindset highlight the eventual 
loss of control on lucrative checkpoints as a sticking point for such a gigantic project, thus casting 
doubts on whether developments at Bagamoyo will actually occur in the near future (Anonymous 
Consignee 2015).
Not all freight forwarders see the Bagamoyo project as ill-conceived (Secretary 2015), though; similar 
divisions exist amongst the authorities. Whilst some of the latter extol the virtues of Bagamoyo, others 
promote the ‘increasing efficiency’ argument. The latter seem to have gained the upper hand so far, as 
the Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project with the World Bank and other donors is set to open new 
logistical space by demolishing two sheds; redrawing the flows of traffic within the port, instituting a 
one-way system of truck and cargo flows; assigning distinct gates for entrance and exit; and reviewing 
general cargo procedures (World Bank 2016).
However, the Bagamoyo megaport has many ardent supporters amongst another section of the 
authorities. They consider the new port in an undeveloped location to be the lasting solution to the 
problems of space within the port and of congestion around it. The latter was significantly true of the 
Kikwete administration. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese operator of the container terminal, CMHI, seconds 
the idea that the new port ‘will fundamentally decongest Dar es Salaam port and city’5; and that it might 
eventually make inroads into the epic scheme of China’s New Silk Road (Forbes, 12 March 2017; The 
Diplomat, December 1 2015). Other supporters emphasise that it would finally be the materialisation, 
just 60 km from Dar, of a vision that former president Kikwete put forward for all Tanzania: ‘If we invest 
in logistic centres, improve on infrastructure and create a facilitative environment, we can easily turn 
Dar es Salaam into another Dubai of its kind’ (Reuters, 11 April 2014).
Interestingly, the vision of a new Dubai via the Bagamoyo option reveals how political elites present 
new infrastructure projects to supersede problems of ‘the old’. Pitching ‘modernity from scrap’ (Dar) 
against ‘modernity from scratch’ (Bagamoyo/Dubai) is a telling example of using legitimising discourses 
to rally political and financial wills behind port authorities. Evidently, the seamlessness that the Dubai 
Logistics City so aptly epitomises (e.g. Cowen 2014; Easterling 2015) is mobilised in this controversy. 
For proponents of Bagamoyo, the failure of Dar es Salaam to curtail disruption, congestion and hin-
drances to seamless flows provides the proof that modernity and efficiency cannot be instilled upon 
old infrastructures to the degree required by global logistics and the global economy. New, mega-in-
frastructure comes to represent ‘the possibility of being modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing 
of that possibility’ (Larkin 2013, 333; also Sneath, Holbraad, and Pedersen 2009).
Importantly, Dubai’s exceptional development is presented in Tanzania as the alternative devel-
opment model to be emulated (even though, or perhaps because, the contours of the ‘model’ remain 
vague, and emulation is more than uncertain due to Dubai’s extremely specific context conditions (see 
Chorin 2010)). The Bagamoyo-Dar controversy thus evidences our broader argument: that greater atten-
tion is required to situated and multifaceted ‘global makings’ (Hönke and Müller 2016) of infrastructures 
that draw on imaginaries well beyond the techno-science of ‘global logistics’ and Western modernity.
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Conclusion
Logistical infrastructures and technologies powerfully shape how mobility and security are governed, 
as Easterling (2015) and others have argued. However, they are also disputed and contested. This arti-
cle has sought to show that the mobilities and security literatures could do more to differentiate, and 
sometimes move beyond, the idea of supposedly encompassing, global technologies of governing 
mobility and security in ports and other infrastructure hubs. In order to question ‘the story of ordering 
logistics politically everywhere’, we proposed a controversies approach. Controversies alert the observer 
to often overlooked diversity, frictions and the overall more fragile and contested nature of port logistics. 
Attention to disputed knowledge (rather than the dominant securitising discourse) and attempts at 
closing such controversies have brought to light non-hegemonic positions, competing projects and 
contesting practices to a supposedly smooth integration of Dar port into regimes of global security 
and mobility. The use of the approach has shown how Dar port assembles a multiplicity of agents, 
imaginaries and technologies of governance that delay and transform a supposedly integrated ‘global 
surface of logistics’. First, the controversies around Dar unveiled differences in the appropriation of 
global standards to produce order. Even though all port stakeholders may agree in principle about the 
opportunity to roll out managerialist, technical solutions to problems of securing and moving cargo, 
they are also at loggerheads about the need to address prevalent settlements in the political econo-
mies of taxation and cargo clearance. Managerialist and political economy framings clash, emerging 
as concomitant projects to close controversies and thus impose a fix to contested issues. Second, the 
controversies approach helped to bring attention to how port authorities attempt to mobilise global 
standards, such as ISPS, to settle public controversies. Third, it revealed how the introduction of elec-
tronic platforms and software have an effect on expanding the autonomy of port authorities vis-à-vis 
other port stakeholders and, revealingly, colleagues in governmental agencies and within their own 
ranks. This, in turn, creates horizontal wrangles within bureaucracies.
In examining these points together, our controversies approach illustrates the extent to which the 
emphasis on the prevalent ‘story of ordering logistics politically everywhere’ is misleading. In particular, 
it brought to the fore the need to unearth the variegated projects for the governance of ports that 
may underlie opposite discursive positions in controversies, as well as the everyday practices of port 
stakeholders. The core of all of this is to call into question how we understand mobility and security in 
the first place. They cannot be fixed in an ontology of a priori research, and controversies is a lens that 
leads us to capture the ‘ontological politics’ over the understanding of these terms in practice.
Furthermore, and this requires particular attention, the Bagamoyo-Dar debate highlights the differ-
ent visions of modernity mobilised in many parts of the Global South today – here the ‘Dubai model’ 
– as alternative projections of ‘how to be modern’ (Larkin 2013) and how to step out of traditional 
postcolonial relations with the West. New white elephants might be part of such ‘new geographies of 
development’ (Sidaway 2012), not too dissimilar to the old ones of the 1950s and 1960s, but the diversity 
of visions and practices at play in infrastructure hubs merits more attention and scrutiny. This opens 
up ‘the story of logistics everywhere’ in yet another direction: to powerful alternative imaginaries and 
situated political economies beyond Western scripts that appropriate, redirect or quell the incorpora-
tion of global logistical standards in ports. To date, these are most visible in the margins of supposedly 
global regimes of mobility and security, which calls for more research and theory building from the 
Global South (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Hönke and Müller 2016).
Overall we hope our piece contributes towards generating more work on ‘logistics-in-action’ that 
approaches issues of mobility and security in new ways. Whilst work through the notion of frictions, 
as recently suggested by Gregson, Crang, and Antonopoulos (2017), zooms in on ruptures and the 
patchwork-like nature of logistical landscapes, controversies offer an important alternative and com-
plementary approach in that they reveal the competing visions, claims to expertise and practices of 
resistance to the overall project. While in many instances, ‘flows of global commerce trump local econ-
omies and ecosystems’ (Carse 2012), and logistical hubs such as ports are part of a system of mobility 
that supports uneven geoecologies (Sheller 2016), the above has shown that not only competing 
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visions and models, but also competing political economies, must be considered to understand how 
mobility and security are governed.
Notes
1.  http://ticts.net/contact-us/visiting-ticts/. Accessed 17 June 2016.
2.  http://www.tra.go.tz/index.php/faqs/405-what-is-tancis. Accessed 13 February 2016.
3.  http://www.eswstz.org/. Accessed 17 June 2016.
4.  Tanzania Daily News. Bagamoyo Port Set to Start Operations by 2020, 29 October 2017.
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